Unfortunately the reality at farm level continues to show stark differences between SA’s response and that of Argentina.
FMD Response SA — a coalition of dairy, pork and beef farmers, together with industry experts — has studied Argentina’s successful handling of its major FMD epidemic from 2000 to 2002.
The Argentinian government managed to stop the disease by making sufficient vaccine doses available at scale, and by allowing the private sector to vaccinate its 60-million cattle within the space of a few months. This is the key ingredient for Argentina’s success: mass vaccination within a tight timeframe.
By contrast, the South African government has a programme that seeks to vaccinate the country’s cattle by the end of the year. So far, in a two-month period, only about 15% or about 2-million cattle have been vaccinated, with 12-million remaining.
The reason for the sluggish pace is that vaccines are being distributed slowly and unevenly by government, and the private sector is not empowered to procure and distribute vaccines for administration at farm level.
Three fundamental conditions must be in place for any country to follow the successful South American models with credibility:
Sufficient vaccine doses must be available;
Health authorities and the private sector must distribute the vaccine quickly and widely enough to create impact; and
Vaccination campaigns must occur within tight windows measured in weeks, not months.
South Africa meets none of these requirements currently.
In South Africa vaccine shortages are a defining feature of the crisis. Centralised ordering and scheduling by the department of agriculture has left farmers waiting months to hear when their cattle will receive protection
At the core of the Argentinian success lies a clear division of roles: the state sets standards, while private industry executes. Argentina’s national animal health authority, Senasa, mandated the timeframes for vaccination cycles, established the rules of vaccination and audited the results.
The state registered vaccines, defined quality standards, imposed vaccination timelines and verified outcomes. Private companies then produced, distributed and administered the vaccines and financed them where appropriate. South Africa has fallen short on each critical element.
Senasa ensured adequate vaccine volumes for nationwide campaigns in Argentina. Private sector producers, which were accredited and reliable suppliers of animal vaccines, supplied the vaccines needed, with industry playing a major role from production to financing. There was no state monopoly on production and distribution.
In South Africa vaccine shortages are a defining feature of the crisis. Centralised ordering and scheduling by the department of agriculture has left farmers waiting months to hear when their cattle will receive protection. Involving private-sector expertise in procurement and distribution would resolve these artificial shortages of vaccine.
Argentina allowed vaccines to flow directly from private manufacturers to farmer organisations and private veterinarians, who administered them on farms under Senasa oversight. The state avoided acting as a middleman and established many parallel supply channels, preventing any single point of failure from paralysing the system.
In South Africa every dose passes through Onderstepoort Biological Products and government structures. This delays distribution. Millions of imported doses from suppliers such as Argentinian producer Biogénesis Bagó and Turkish producer Dollvet could travel straight to private vets. The arrangement that vaccines must go via Onderstepoort and provincial systems introduces unnecessary delays, cold-chain vulnerabilities and added costs.
WEEKEND-VIEWPOINT- Foot-and-Mouth Disease is still a huge problem-
Invoking the Argentinian model requires successfully replicating what actually delivered their results: letting the private sector take an active role in an effective mass vaccination programme
In addition to allowing private sector procurement and production, Argentina imposed strict cycles for when vaccination must take place. Farmer organisations then ensured vaccines were administered in tight windows of weeks. Eligible herds received vaccinations and a booster dose six months later, achieving simultaneous peak immunity and denying the virus opportunities to spread.
When all cattle receive the vaccine or a booster at around the same time they all become immune to the virus, and it stops spreading. However, South Africa’s rollout is beginning to stretch across months in an open-ended fashion. When cattle are vaccinated too slowly, after four to six months immunity fades in cattle in one area before cattle are vaccinated in another, allowing the virus to persist and advance.
The consequences of the slow response to FMD extends well beyond farms. Feed mills operate below capacity. Equipment sales have declined in affected districts. Mechanics, transporters, contractors and input suppliers report falling demand as farm incomes decline. Farmers do not have money to buy new equipment and agricultural implements or are saving capital in anticipation of a breakout of FMD on their farms.
To stop the devastation on farms and the impact on downstream industries, South Africa can and must learn from Argentina. However, invoking the Argentinian model requires successfully replicating what actually delivered their results: letting the private sector take an active role in an effective mass vaccination programme.
• Morphew is a commercial dairy farmer and spokesperson for FMD Response SA, a group of pork, beef and dairy farmers and industry experts formed to encourage private sector involvement in the response to foot-and-mouth disease.
